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Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road From Guardianship to
Supported Decision-Making
By Robert D. Dinerstein*

I

Introduction

n deceptively simple language, Article 12 of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis
abilities (“CRPD”), Equal Recognition before the law,
provides that “States Parties shall recognize that persons with
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others
in all aspects of life.”1 If, as is clear from the deliberations that
produced this article, Article 12’s use of the term “legal capacity”
includes not simply the capacity to have rights (or passive capacity)
but also the capacity to act or exercise one’s rights, an important question that arises is how to address the circumstances of
individuals with disabilities who may not be able to exercise
their legal capacity without some kind of assistance or intervention. Article 12(3) addresses this question in language that once
again seems straightforward and
uncontroversial: “States Parties
shall take appropriate measures
to provide access by persons
with disabilities to the support
they may require in exercising
their legal capacity.”2 Yet this
use of the word “support,” and
the related concept of supported
decision making, represents nothing less than a “paradigm shift”3
away from well-established but
increasingly discredited notions
of substituted decision making.
Rhetorical identification of the
shift from substituted to supported decision making, however, is one thing; understanding
what these terms mean, and fully implementing a regime truly
oriented toward supporting rather than supplanting the decisionmaking rights of people with disabilities, is quite another matter.

To paraphrase one commentator, with Article 12 “on the books,”
now comes the hard part.4
In this essay, after providing some background on Article 12
and its relationship to core values immanent in the CRPD as a
whole, I set out some of the characteristics of guardianship — the
primary form of substituted decision making employed around
the world — and its alternatives. I then explore the concept of
supported decision making and some of the ways in which it
has, or might function. Finally, I discuss some of the beginning
efforts to come to terms with the meaning of supported decision
making in which States Parties, non-governmental organizations,
and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities are
engaged. Early indications are that there continues to be substantial confusion, at least on the part of States Parties, over the
meaning of supported decision
making, to say nothing of the
fitful process some countries are
experiencing in changing their
laws to provide for this form
of assistance to individuals with
disabilities. I will conclude with
some observations about steps
people with disabilities, NGOs,
policy-makers, and others might
take to hasten States’ embrace of
supported decision making and
make the exciting promise of the
CRPD a reality for people with
disabilities.

“…Article 12 was one of
the most hotly contested
articles to be considered
during the treaty
deliberation process.”
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Article 12 and its Importance
As Amita Dhanda5 and others6 have documented, Article
12 was one of the most hotly contested articles to be considered during the treaty deliberation process. In addition to the
controversy surrounding the provision of support, the nature of
substituted decision-making arrangements, and the kinds of
“due process” protections that should be in place with respect
to legal capacity, a key dispute was whether there needed to be
a distinction between the legal capacity for rights and the legal
capacity to act.7 After much back-and-forth discussion, an alternative draft, and a last-minute footnote that purported to reject
the concept of legal capacity to act on linguistic grounds, the
States Parties adopted Article 12 and its commitment to recognizing legal capacity to the fullest extent.8
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Article 12’s emphasis on legal capacity and the choicemaking that underlies the concept, as well as its statement that
“persons with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law,”9 resonates with other important provisions of the CRPD. The Preamble to the Convention
recognizes “the importance for persons with disabilities of their
individual autonomy and independence, including the freedom
to make their own choices,”10 and adds that “persons with
disabilities should have the opportunity to be actively involved
in decision-making processes about policies and programmes,
including those directly concerning them.”11 Article 3 of the
CRPD proper, General Principles, includes “respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make
one’s own choices, and independence of persons” and “full and
effective participation and inclusion in society.”12 Article 5’s call
for equality and non-discrimination emphasizes that “all persons
are equal before and under the law” and that States may need
to provide reasonable accommodations to ensure that equality and non-discrimination are achieved.13 Article 19, Living
independently and being included in the community, provides that
“States Parties . . . recognize the equal right of all persons with
disabilities to live in the community, with choices equal to others”
and must ensure that “[p]ersons with disabilities have the opportunity to choose their place of residence and where and with
whom they live on an equal basis with others. . . .”14 Article 23,
Respect for home and the family, requires non-discrimination
“against persons with disabilities in all matters relating to marriage, family, parenthood, and relationships, on an equal basis
with others” and ensures that people with disabilities of marriageable age have the rights to marry and found a family.15
Article 26, Habilitation and Rehabilitation, requires States Parties
to adopt measures to enable people with disabilities to achieve
and maintain “maximum independence” and “full inclusion and
participation in all aspects of life.”16 Plainly, if an individual
with disability is deemed not to have legal capacity, the person’s
ability to make choices, achieve maximum independence and be
fully included in the community is fatally compromised.

The importance of Article 12’s insistence on the recognition of legal capacity of people with disabilities also must be
understood in the context of the historical treatment of people
with disabilities and their presumed inability to make decisions
about their lives. Society assumes that adults of typical intelligence, psychosocial functioning, and sensory ability are able
to engage in all aspects of life — deciding where to live, whom
(or whether) to marry, how to spend one’s money (or to whom
to leave it), for whom to vote — on an autonomous basis, with
whatever assistance they choose to seek out and consider in their
decision making. But for adults with disabilities, the picture has
been and continues to be quite different. States have assumed
that the mere status of having an intellectual or psychosocial
disability (or some sensory disabilities21) provides a sufficient
basis to presume that the individual is unable to participate fully
and autonomously in society, in other words, that the individual
lacks the legal capacity to exercise his or her rights. People with
disabilities were objects of pity, not people with self-respect.22
In this mode of thinking, people with disabilities need protection, not rights. Guardianship is the primary mechanism through
which states have provided this protection; it is a mechanism
that, at least in its most complete form, the CRPD, and Article
12, seeks to limit significantly.23

From Guardianship to Supported Decision Making
Guardianship is a form of surrogate decision making, usually
imposed after a court proceeding, that substitutes as decision
maker another individual (the guardian) for the individual in
question (called variously the ward or the allegedly incapacitated
person). Full or plenary guardianship may or may not provide
protection to the individual with a disability — there are numerous examples of guardians who have taken advantage of, ignored,
or otherwise failed to serve the interests of the person they were
supposedly protecting — but even when it is functioning as
intended it evokes a kind of “civil death”24 for the individual, who
is no longer permitted to participate in society without mediation through the actions of another if at all. Plenary guardianship
falsely assumes that incapacity for individuals with disabilities is
an all or nothing proposition; that where found it exists in all areas
of an individual’s life; and that, once found to exist the individual
(especially one with an intellectual disability) will not regain
capacity at some later time. It fails to recognize that people with
disabilities, like people without disabilities, have areas of varying
capacity, in different areas of their lives, and at different times.25

The requirement in Article 12(3) that States Parties provide
access to whatever supports people with disabilities need to exercise their capacity reflects the critical insight that even people
with the most significant disabilities have legal capacity and are
covered by the CRPD. The provision builds on the statement in the
Preamble that “recogniz[es] the need to promote and protect the
human rights of all persons with disabilities, including those who
require more intensive support.17 Article 12(4) expands on the
desired characteristics of support by providing that, among other
things, capacity-related measures “respect the rights, will, and
preferences of the person” and “are proportional and tailored to
the person’s circumstances. . . .”18 Article 12 is not the only place
in the CRPD where support in one or more forms (including
personal assistance) appears; Articles 19 (Living independently
and being included in the community), 20 (Personal mobility),
24 (2)(d), (e) (Education), among others, all include references
to the need to provide support to people with disabilities.19 The
salience of support is a concrete expression of the social, interactive model of disability that animates the entire Convention
and sees disability as not a thing in and of itself but rather as a
product of the interaction between an individual and his or her
built and attitudinal environments.20

In recent years, some states have begun to move away from
plenary guardianship as providing more protection than the individual with disability needs, and as being far from the least restrictive manner in which to provide it.26 Alternatives such as durable
powers-of-attorney, advance directives, health care proxies,
representative payee regimes, direct bank deposit systems, and
other modalities can provide more targeted assistance to the
individual and at the same time avoid the stigma and indignity
of the individual being determined incompetent (or lacking in
capacity) for all purposes. Even when some might believe that
some form of guardianship is appropriate, limited or partial
guardianship is preferable to plenary guardianship in that the
court specifically identifies those areas in which the guardian is
needed and the individual retains full decision-making capacity
in all other areas of his or her life. Other reforms have focused
9
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“The paradigm shift reflected in the move from
substitute to supported decision making aims to retain
the individual as the primary decision maker but
recognizes that an individual’s autonomy can be expressed
in multiple ways….”
on increasing the level of due process that a state must provide
before a guardianship can be imposed (e.g., right to a hearing,
legal representation, elevated standard of proof, right to confront
witnesses and present one’s own witnesses, right to appeal, and
provision for periodic review) and have established that the
guardian should use the standard of “substituted judgment”
when acting on the individual’s behalf — that is, the guardian
should strive to determine what decision the individual would
make if he or she could do so rather than make the choice that
the guardian believes is in the individual’s best interest.
Important as these reforms of guardianship have been, however, they still accept the predominance of a legal regime that
locates decision making in the surrogate or guardian and not
in the individual being assisted. In contrast, supported decision
making, which Article 12 embraces, retains the individual as the
primary decision maker, while recognizing that the individual
with a disability may need some assistance — and perhaps a
great deal of it — in making and communicating a decision. The
paradigm shift reflected in the move from substitute to supported
decision making aims to retain the individual as the primary
decision maker but recognizes that an individual’s autonomy can
be expressed in multiple ways, and that autonomy itself need not
be inconsistent with having individuals in one’s life to provide
support, guidance and assistance to a greater or lesser degree, so
long as it is at the individual’s choosing.

Supported Decision-Making
Supported decision-making can be defined as a series of relationships, practices, arrangements, and agreements, of more or
less formality and intensity, designed to assist an individual with
a disability to make and communicate to others decisions about
the individual’s life. Some of the above alternatives to guardianship could be part of a supported decision-making regime,
though, to the extent they involve the individual with a disability
identifying someone else as authorized to speak for him or her,
they can move into a form of substituted decision-making (albeit
one that is less restrictive of the individual’s liberty than guardianship). A purer form of supported decision-making would rely
on peer support (for example, ex-users of psychiatric services
for people with psycho-social disabilities), community support
networks and personal assistance,27 so-called natural supports
(family, friends), or representatives (pursuant to a representation agreement28) to speak with, rather than for, the individual

with a disability. “What the Convention requires is that the
support should be based on trust, be provided with respect and
not against the will of the person with disabilities.”29 Countries
such as Sweden (through its use of the “god man”30), a number
of provinces in Canada,31 and Germany 32 have made extensive
use of supported decision-making arrangements to greater or
lesser degree.
Inclusion Europe, an organization that advocates for the
human rights of individuals with intellectual disabilities, has
issued a Position Paper in which it identifies eight key elements
of a system of supported decision-making:
• Promotion and support of self-advocacy.
• Using mainstream mechanisms for the protection of the
best interests of a person. Accessibility and accommodation
are important.
• Replacing traditional guardianship by a system of supported decision-making (recognizing that there needs to be
a transition period from guardianship to support)
• Supporting decision-making. One should look to a formal
system of support with registered supporters only for
“essential and important decisions of legal relevance.” For
many everyday decisions, informal support networks are
sufficient and should be used wherever possible.
• Selection and registration of support persons. Jurisdictions
need a registration system to reassure those who come into
contact with persons with disabilities that the supporters are
authorized to assist them. Such a system can also facilitate
the training individuals will need.
• Overcoming communication barriers. Augmentative and
alternative means of communication must be used when
necessary.
• Preventing and resolving conflicts between supporter and
supported person.
• Implementing safeguards. These safeguards must ensure that
there is a level of proportionality in the support provided.33
Michael Bach has identified three common elements to
supported decision-making models in Canada: (1) they are
based on a set of guiding principles that emphasize the person
with disability’s autonomy, presumption of capacity, and right
to make decisions on an equal basis with others; (2) they recognize that a person’s intent can form the basis of a decisionmaking process that does not entail removal of the individual’s
decision-making rights; and (3) they acknowledge that individuals
3
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with disabilities will often need assistance in decision-making
through such means as interpreter assistance, facilitated communication, assistive technologies and plain language.34

decision-making. Tunisia reported that it permits guardianship
on the grounds of “insanity, mental impairment or profligacy.”39
The State said nothing about whether it provided for supported
decision-making or, if not, what its plans were for moving
toward adoption of such a scheme. The report on Tunisia by
the International Disability Alliance noted that “Tunisia does
not understand supported decision-making,”40 and another nongovernmental organization, Atlas Council, also was critical of
Tunisia’s compliance with Article 12.41 Tunisia’s response to the
Committee’s List of issues (which included questions regarding
the application of legal capacity, the kinds of guardianship, and
whether there were any measures to move toward supported
decision making) showed no greater understanding of the issue.

Supported decision making thus permits vindication of
Article 12’s imperative that all people with disabilities retain
their legal capacity, even those who may need significant and
intensive support to effectuate it. But whether countries move
toward adopting it in lieu of substituted decision-making regimes
depends in the first instance on how they interpret their practices
with respect to Article 12 and how treaty bodies and non-governmental organizations respond to those interpretations.

Implementing Supported Decision-Making under
Article 12: The Hard Part Begins

In its Country Report, Spain, in Paragraph 53, claimed to be in
compliance with Article 12(3)’s requirement of providing access
to supports because it had guardianship statutes!42 It reported
that a finding of incapacity could be made on the basis that
the person could not act “unaided.”43 It proposed to change its
terminology from deprivation of legal capacity to modification
of legal capacity, maintaining that this change in nomenclature
would constitute compliance with the CRPD.44 The non-governmental organization CERMI45 stated more directly that Spanish
laws did not provide for supported decision-making.46 Once
again, the Committee’s list of
issues identified guardianship
practices as a cause for concern
under Article 12; it requested
Spain to report on the number
of people under guardianship
and the number of rulings modifying an individual’s capacity
to act; to explain how an individual subject to guardianship
was sufficiently protected given
the absence of statutory language addressing the guardian’s
potential undue influence on
or conflict of interest with the
ward; and to report on any
measures designed to replace
substituted decision-making
with supported decision-making.47 Spain’s response essentially indicated that it is the
court’s responsibility to protect
the interest of the individual
under guardianship.48

Under Article 4 of the CRPD, States Parties are obligated “to
adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights” in the CRPD and “to
take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against persons with disabilities.”35 To the
extent a state provides only for plenary guardianship and makes
no provision to assist people
with disabilities to obtain the
supports they need for decisionmaking, their laws would seem
in clear violation of Article 12.

“To the extent a state
provides only for plenary
guardianship and makes no
provision to assist people
with disabilities to obtain
the supports they need
for decision-making, their
laws would seem in clear
violation of Article 12.”

Article 34 of the CRPD
created an expert committee,
the Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities
(“the Committee”), to review
and comment upon the activities of States Parties to the
CRPD.36 Pursuant to Article
35 (1), States Parties must file
with the Committee “a comprehensive report on measures
taken to give effect to its obligations under [the CRPD] and
on the progress made in that
regard” within two years after
the CRPD enters into force
for that country.37 To date,
the Committee has met for six
sessions, with a seventh scheduled for April 16-20, 2012.38
The Committee has adopted
Concluding Observations on two countries — Tunisia (at its
Fifth Session) and Spain (at its Sixth Session) — and has
received reports from 26 other countries (or sub-country entities)
as of the upcoming Seventh Session. At the Seventh Session, the
Committee expects to adopt Concluding Observations on Peru,
and will adopt a list of issues for Argentina, China and Hungary.
Thus, the work of interpreting and implementing the CRPD is
in its very early stages.

Notwithstanding these disappointing state reports, the good
news is that the Committee’s Concluding Observations for both
Tunisia and Spain reflect its understanding of Article 12 and its
commitment to keep the focus on supported decision-making.
At its Fifth Session, with regard to Tunisia’s compliance with
Article 12, the Committee stated that it was “concerned that no
measures have been undertaken to replace substitute decisionmaking by supported decision making in the exercise of legal
capacity” and went on to recommend that Tunisia review its
guardianship laws “and take action to develop laws and policies
to replace regimes of substitute decision-making by supported

The States Parties reports to the Committee from Tunisia and
Spain reflect that those countries’ governments may not truly
understand the difference between substituted and supported
11
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decision-making.”49 It added that relevant public officials and
other stakeholders should receive training on this issue. At its
Sixth Session, the Committee made the same recommendation to
Spain in its Concluding Observations regarding the review of state
guardianship laws and their replacement by supported decision
making (adding that the latter “respects the person’s autonomy,
will and preferences.”).50 In preparation for the upcoming
Seventh Session, in which it expects to issue its Concluding
Observations on Peru, the Committee propounded among its list
of issues a question that asked the state to: indicate the number
of people with disabilities under guardianship (as a percentage
of all people with disabilities in the country): provide information on the legal criteria for guardianship and any procedures
for challenging decisions ordering it; and clarify the meaning of
the concept of people “unable to look after themselves due to a
mental or physical disability.”51
Furthermore, at least some of the countries who have filed
reports but that have not yet been on the Committee’s agenda do
seem to recognize that their existing legislation or practice is at
odds with Article 12. For example, Argentina has reported that
its legislation does not comport with Article 12 because it does
not provide for supported decision-making.52 Hungary reported
on a statute that adopted provisions abolishing guardianship in
favor of supported decision-making, but noted that the statute
did not come into force.53 Both Australia54 and Austria55 contend that substituted decision making is used as a last resort.
Ireland has identified legal capacity as a crucial issue to address
in connection with its efforts to ratify the CRPD, recognizing
that its 1871 Lunacy Regulations are in dire need of attention.56
Outside of the CRPD process, other countries are making
strides toward addressing their laws for protecting the legal capacity of individuals with disabilities. According to the website of
Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (“MDAC”), an organization
that closely monitors developments in Europe in the area of legal
capacity, Bulgaria, which only recently ratified the CRPD, has
formed a task force on legal capacity law reform.57 The Czech
Republic recently enacted (February 20, 2012) a new civil code
that introduces supported decision making and views restriction
on legal capacity as a last resort. According to MDAC, the Czech
Republic is the first country to enact legal capacity reform based
on the CRPD.58

Conclusion: Next Steps
To be sure, the above actions are nascent, and, in some cases,
seem to represent a “two steps forward, one step back” approach
to the legislative and regulatory change needed to implement
Article 12. Nevertheless, states interested in complying with
Article 12, or at least assessing the extent to which their existing legislation falls short of its mandate, can look to a variety
of sources for inspiration in addition to the efforts the above
states are undertaking. Even before the CRPD was adopted, the
Montreal Declaration on Intellectual Disabilities, issued in 2004,
called for supported decision making for people with intellectual
disabilities.59 As noted above,60 the International Disability
Alliance has issued a Legal Opinion on Article 12. The United

Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Thematic Study
on enhancing awareness and understanding of the CRPD sets out
clear (if not uncontroversial) views about Article 12’s reach.61
More recently, the European Commissioner for Human Rights’
report, Who Gets to Decide?, calls on member states of the
Council of Europe to abolish mechanisms for full incapacitation
and plenary guardianship and adopt supported decision-making
standards.62 Entities as disparate as a Surrogate Court judge in
New York City63 and the Inter-American system’s Committee for
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons
with Disabilities64 have cited to Article 12 as persuasive authority
in examining, respectively, a guardianship proceeding and the
meaning of the Inter-American disability convention. Litigation
brought before domestic courts and human rights commissions
and courts; conferences and workshops featuring experts from
around the world; foundations supporting international disability rights; non-governmental organizations (including those
producing alternative reports for states reporting to the CRPD’s
Committee); and, perhaps most importantly, people with disabilities themselves are important resources for assisting states that
truly want to understand what supported decision making really
means and why it is critical if Article 12 is to be implemented.
In addition, as the Committee itself has recognized, it is critical that states provide training for policy-makers and relevant
stakeholders (including people with disabilities themselves, as
well as governmental officials, health care personnel, and the
business community, who come into contact with people with
disabilities) on the meaning of supported decision-making —
training that is concrete and practical as well as grounded in a
solid philosophical and legal framework of autonomy, equality
and non-discrimination. The reports of states that think they
are providing supported decision making through guardianship
suggest that there is much training work to accomplish. But
even if supported decision-making is a relatively new concept
within international human rights, it has been operating in
some countries, such as Canada, for over 20 years. There is
wisdom to be tapped.
The responsibility for implementation of the CRPD is not
limited to the actions of States Parties. Article 33’s requirement
that States Parties establish national implementation and monitoring mechanisms, with participation by civil society (including
people with disabilities and their representative organizations),
provides an opportunity for individuals and groups to keep a
watch on states’ compliance with the Convention, and can provide
an important source of information to the Committee. Finally,
for those states that adopt the Optional Protocol,65 the filing of
individual complaints can serve to encourage compliance with
the CRPD.66
Enacting appropriate state legislation, and monitoring compliance with the CRPD, will not transform decision-making regimes
from substituted to supported decision-making overnight, but they
are a start. The human rights of people with disabilities demand
that we not delay in making sure the paradigm shift represented
by Article 12 becomes a reality.

Endnotes on page 72
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